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This article reviews some key developments in the field of torts during 2018. As will be seen, a variety 
of interesting questions have arisen for decision. A number of the cases concern professional persons, 
and those that do not nonetheless raise issues relevant to the field of professional liability. 
Liability for negligence 
Nature of the damage 
A duty of care is normally owed by a person who by negligence causes personal injury to another. A 
duty equally is likely to be owed to an owner where a person negligently causes physical damage to a 
building, or physical damage to or loss of personal property. However, in the case of mental injury the 
position in leading common law countries diverges, with a narrow approach to the duty question being 
taken in the UK and a broader approach, in line with that taken in physical injury cases, being taken in 
Australia and Canada. Further controversy tends to surround the question of recovery in negligence 
for financial loss, and here, both in the UK and elsewhere, various special controls apply. 
If a duty is more easily established where damage is physical, then the correct classification of the 
damage is likely to be important. Determining whether there has been physical injury or harm to the 
person does not usually give rise to special difficulty, but questions as to the very nature of physical 
injury occasionally can arise. The decision of the Supreme Court in Dryden v Johnson Matthey Plc1 
provides an example. The claimants were employed by the defendants at chemical plants where they 
were negligently exposed to platinum salts and sensitised to a full blown platinum allergy. Persons 
who had been sensitised but had not yet developed symptoms were not limited in any way in their 
lives, except that they needed to avoid circumstances in which they were exposed to platinum salts. 
Platinum salts were not encountered in everyday life, only in certain specialised workplaces, and 
sensitised people could not work in jobs which involved the potential for further exposure. In these 
circumstances the Court of Appeal held that they could not claim in respect of personal injury where 
no allergy had developed and their condition was and would remain symptomless.2 But the Supreme 
Court was satisfied that the claimants had in fact suffered actionable injury and that their claim should 
succeed. 
Lady Black, giving a judgment with which the other justices agreed, noted that the parties were agreed 
that if a person were to develop a platinum salt allergy as a result of improper exposure to platinum 
salts at work, as opposed to mere sensitisation, he or she would have suffered personal injury of a 
type which would give rise to a cause of action in tort. What divided them was whether or not 
sensitisation on its own was actionable personal injury. The claimants relied upon Cartledge v E Jopling 
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& Sons Ltd3 as supporting their case that it was, and Johnson Matthey relied upon Rothwell v Chemical 
and Insulating Co Ltd4 as supporting their case that it was not. 
In Cartledge the claims were brought by steel dressers who had contracted pneumoconiosis whilst 
working in the defendant’s factory, and the issue was whether their claims were statute-barred. The 
House of Lords held that a cause of action for injury by pneumoconiosis accrued when damage by 
scarring of the lung tissue from inhaling silica dust must have occurred, notwithstanding that the 
plaintiffs did not find out about the injury for a number of years. Their actions were commenced more 
than six years after the date of the unknown damage, and accordingly they were held to be barred. 
Lord Pearce affirmed that actionable harm could be suffered despite the fact that a man had no 
knowledge of the secret onset of pneumoconiosis and suffered no present inconvenience from it. The 
question was whether he had suffered material damage by any physical changes in his body, and this 
was a question of fact in each case. 
In Rothwell the claimants were negligently exposed by their employers to asbestos dust, putting them 
at risk of developing one or more long-term asbestos related diseases. They had not in fact contracted 
such diseases, but their exposure had caused them to develop pleural plaques, viz localised areas of 
pleural thickening. These plaques had no adverse effect on any bodily function and did not themselves 
have the propensity to develop into an asbestos related disease, but the claimants argued that 
physical changes to the body coupled with the risk of future injury from exposure to asbestos and 
which caused consequent anxiety could found a claim for negligence. However, the House of Lords 
rejected their argument. Lord Hoffmann said the important point was that, save in the most 
exceptional case, the plaques would never cause any symptoms, did not increase the susceptibility of 
the claimants to other diseases and did not shorten their expectation of life. They had no effect on 
their health at all. So they were not damage. This being so, his Lordship asked whether they became 
damage when aggregated with the risk which they evidenced or the anxiety which that risk caused. 
Yet neither head was independently actionable,5 and they could not be relied on to create a cause of 
action which would not otherwise exist. 
In the instant case Lady Black said that what mattered was the behaviour of the IgE antibody, which 
was produced by an individual who had suffered platinum salt sensitisation. If such an individual was 
again exposed to platinum salts, the antibody was likely to react in a way which produced allergic 
symptoms. When individuals became sensitised, that change to their bodies meant that they lost their 
capacity to work around platinum salts. The physiological changes to the claimants’ bodies were 
undoubtedly harmful, and, applying Cartledge, the absence of symptoms did not prevent a condition 
from amounting to personal injury. What had happened to the claimants was that their bodily capacity 
for work had been impaired, making them significantly worse off, and their sensitisation was, 
therefore, actionable injury in its own right. In Rothwell, by contrast, the pleural plaques would not 
lead to or contribute to any condition which would produce symptoms, even with further exposure to 
asbestos dust. 
The decision that sensitisation was personal injury meant that their Lordships did not need to consider 
the claimants’ alternative argument, that they could recover damages for economic loss under an 
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implied contractual term and/or in negligence on their being redeployed or dismissed or on being 
caused to resign. On this question the Court of Appeal had held that the financial consequences for 
the employees of losing their jobs were governed by their ordinary rights under their contracts, and 
the principles of tort would not impose on the defendant employers a more extensive obligation. The 
decision illustrates that the courts are likely to deny a duty of care as between contracting parties 
where there is inconsistency between any such duty and the assumed contractual obligations of the 
parties.  
Dryden has been described as a decision at the very limits of ‘personal injury.6 Certainly it is not 
obvious that platinum sensitisation should be treated as personal injury to someone whose work does 
not involve contact with platinum. In this case the impact of the sensitisation on that person’s life 
could fairly be described as negligible. Perhaps an alternative line of argument for their Lordships 
could have been to focus on the costs for these claimants of preventing or averting physical harm.7 
This also would have allowed their Lordships to avoid getting entangled in the intricacies of the law 
governing the recovery in negligence of pure financial losses. 
Determining the duty issue 
Ever since Lord Atkin’s seminal judgment in Donoghue v Stevenson8 the courts have continued to 
debate an appropriate methodology for determining whether one person owes to another a duty to 
take care. For a time the Anns two-stage approach commanded widespread support, being regularly 
invoked by the courts throughout the common law world. Fairly soon, however, doubts began to 
surface, the House of Lords itself started having second thoughts, and in a series of decisions9 
culminating in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman10 the two-stage test came to be abandoned. In Caparo 
Lord Bridge emphasised the inability of any single general principle to provide a practical test that 
could be applied to every situation to determine whether a duty of care was owed and, if so, what 
was its scope. His Lordship said that whether the courts would recognise a duty of care in any 
particular case depended on the foreseeability of the harm, the proximity of the relationship between 
the parties and, generally, considerations of fairness and reasonableness. These concepts of proximity 
and fairness were not susceptible of such precise definition as would be necessary to give them utility 
as practical tests, but amounted, in effect, to little more than convenient labels to attach to the 
features of different specific situations which, on a detailed examination of all the circumstances, the 
law recognised pragmatically as giving rise to a duty of care of a given scope. The law should develop 
novel categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories, rather than 
by a massive extension of a prima facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable stage two 
considerations.11 
Lord Bridge certainly saw the Anns approach as too broad and expansionist, leading him to reaffirm 
the importance of the traditional categorisation of distinct and recognisable situations as guides to 
the existence, the scope, and the limits of the varied duties of care the law imposes. In 2018 five 
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decisions in the Supreme Court - Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police,12 Darnley v 
Croydon Health Services NHS Trust,13 NRAM Ltd v Steel,14 Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale 
del Lavoro SpA15 and James-Bowen v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis,16 considered below in 
that order - have put the focus on the approach taken in Caparo or on other duty ‘tests’ and how they 
ought to be understood. In addition, a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada has considered 
the duty question in the context of a defendant’s failure to prevent a third party from causing injury.17 
Negligent conduct causing personal injury 
In Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police18 Lord Reed warned at some length against 
misconceiving the role that should be played by the Caparo inquiry. His Lordship said that the 
proposition that the test applied to all claims in the modern law of negligence, and that in 
consequence the court would only impose a duty of care where it considered it fair, just and 
reasonable to do so on the particular facts, was mistaken. Applying the approach adopted in Caparo, 
there were many situations in which it had been clearly established that a duty of care was or was not 
owed. Where the existence or non-existence of a duty of care had been established, a consideration 
of justice and reasonableness formed part of the basis on which the law had arrived at the relevant 
principles. It was therefore unnecessary and inappropriate to reconsider whether the existence of the 
duty was fair, just and reasonable (subject to the possibility that the court might be invited to depart 
from an established line of authority). Nor, a fortiori, could justice and reasonableness constitute a 
basis for discarding established principles and deciding each case according to what the court might 
regard as its broader merits. Such an approach would be a recipe for inconsistency and uncertainty. 
Lord Reed affirmed that it was normally only in a novel type of case, where established principles did 
not provide an answer, that the courts needed to go beyond existing principles in order to decide 
whether a duty of care should be recognised. Following Caparo, the characteristic approach of the 
common law in such situations was to develop incrementally and by analogy with established 
authority. The drawing of an analogy depended on identifying the legally significant features of the 
situations with which the earlier authorities were concerned. The courts also had to exercise judgment 
when deciding whether a duty of care should be recognised in a novel type of case. It was the exercise 
of judgment in those circumstances that involved consideration of what was ‘fair, just and reasonable’. 
Accordingly, properly understood, Caparo achieved a balance between legal certainty and justice. In 
the ordinary run of cases, courts considered what had been decided previously and followed the 
precedents (unless it was necessary to consider whether the precedents should be departed from). In 
cases where the question whether a duty of care arose had not previously been decided, the courts 
would consider the closest analogies in the existing law, with a view to maintaining the coherence of 
the law and the avoidance of inappropriate distinctions. They would also weigh up the reasons for and 
against imposing liability, in order to decide whether the existence of a duty of care would be just and 
reasonable. 
In Robinson itself the claimant was walking along a street when she was injured in a melee involving 
two police officers who were struggling to arrest a drug dealer. The Court of Appeal held that the 
police owed no duty to the claimant to take care, on the basis that they were not liable for their acts 
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and omissions in the course of investigating and suppressing crime and apprehending offenders,19 but 
that decision was emphatically reversed in the Supreme Court. Lord Reed said that there was no such 
rule and that the police generally owed a duty of care when such a duty arose under ordinary principles 
of the law of negligence, unless statute or the common law provided otherwise. In the particular case, 
the ground of action was liability for damage caused by carelessness on the part of the police officers 
in circumstances in which it was reasonably foreseeable that their carelessness would result in the 
claimant being injured. Her complaint was not that the police officers failed to protect her against the 
risk of being injured, but that their actions resulted in her being injured. In short, the case was 
concerned with a positive act, not an omission. 
If the facts could be seen to point to the claimant’s injury having been inflicted by the criminal rather 
than by the police officers, the claimant would need to establish that the police officers owed a duty 
to protect her and were in breach of that duty. Maybe a duty could be found depending on the 
circumstances, although at the time of the injury the criminal probably would need to be under the 
police officers’ control,20 and whether there was a breach also would very likely be in dispute. 
However, the police officers accepted that in making their planned arrest it was necessary to consider 
the risk to those in the vicinity, and the evidence showed that at the critical moment the claimant had 
just walked past the criminal and was within a yard of him and in full view, yet the arresting officer 
simply failed to notice her. It was simply a claim alleging personal injury caused by positive conduct, 
and such claims do not normally give rise to a contestable duty issue. Their Lordships’ decision 
accordingly can be seen as an affirmation of ordinary principle. 
Negligent statements causing personal injury 
Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust21 is a second decision of the Supreme Court where the 
claim was treated in a similar way. The claimant had been struck on the head by an unknown assailant 
and was driven by a friend to the accident and emergency department of the defendant’s hospital. He 
told the receptionist that he was feeling very unwell and was worried that he needed urgent attention. 
The receptionist told him that he would have to wait up to four to five hours before somebody looked 
at him, but this was incorrect and she should have said that he could expect to be seen by a triage 
nurse within 30 minutes of arrival. The claimant felt too unwell to remain and wanted to go home to 
take some paracetamol, and he and his friend left without informing the receptionist or anyone else. 
After he got home the claimant became distressed, an ambulance was called and he was rushed back 
to hospital. A scan showed that he had suffered a large extra-dural haematoma and he underwent an 
operation for its evacuation, but he suffered permanent brain damage in the form of a severe and 
very disabling left hemiplegia. 
Lord Lloyd-Jones emphasised that the court was not concerned with the imposition of a duty of care 
in a novel situation. The common law in the UK had abandoned the search for a general principle 
capable of providing a practical test applicable in every situation in order to determine whether a duty 
of care was owed and, if so, what was its scope. In the absence of such a universal touchstone, it had 
taken as a starting point established categories of specific situations where a duty of care was 
recognised and it had been willing to move beyond those situations on an incremental basis, accepting 
or rejecting a duty of care in novel situations by analogy with established categories. The familiar 
statement of principle by Lord Bridge in Caparo, referring to the ingredients of foreseeability of 
damage, proximity and fairness, did not require a re-evaluation of whether those criteria were 
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satisfied on every occasion on which an established category of duty was applied. In particular, as Lord 
Reed demonstrated in his judgment in Robinson, where the existence of a duty of care had previously 
been established, a consideration of justice and reasonableness had already been taken into account 
in arriving at the relevant principles and it was, normally, only in cases where the court was asked to 
go beyond the established categories of duty of care that it would be necessary to consider whether 
it would be fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty. Robinson itself involved no more than the 
application of a well-established category of duty of care and all that was required was the application 
to particular circumstances of established principles. 
Applying the law to the facts, Lord Lloyd-Jones said that the duty of the defendant had to be 
considered in the round. While it was not the function of reception staff to give wider advice or 
information in general to patients, it was the duty of the NHS Trust to take care not to provide 
misinformation to patients and that duty was not avoided by the misinformation having been provided 
by reception staff as opposed to medical staff. His Lordship was satisfied that the existence of a duty 
was clear and that the case was really about the question of negligent breach of duty.22 Here the 
claimant was misinformed as to the true position and, as a result, misled as to the availability of 
medical assistance. The trial judge made the critical finding that it was reasonably foreseeable that a 
person who believed that it might be four or five hours before he would be seen by a doctor might 
decide to leave. In the light of that finding his Lordship had no doubt that the provision of such 
misleading information by a receptionist was negligent. 
Actions in respect of negligent words are treated differently according to whether the words cause 
financial or physical damage. Negligent misstatements causing financial loss tend to give rise to a fear 
of indeterminate liability, and a consequent need to impose strict limits on the existence or ambit of 
any duty. But words are likely to be treated in the same way as positive conduct where reliance on the 
words leads to physical injury. A duty generally can be founded on the foreseeability of the injury and 
the proximity between the adviser and the advisee. Extra controls might exceptionally be needed in 
respect of advice disseminated to large numbers of physical victims, but the cases have tended not to 
raise difficulties of this kind. In any event Darnley raised no such issue and, accordingly, the duty 
question was straightforward. Other examples where liability was imposed in respect of physical injury 
include: an architect assuring a demolition contractor that a wall on the demolition site could safely 
be left standing;23 a doctor negligently warning a patient about the risks of undergoing an operation;24 
and a local authority giving negligent advice to a mother concerning the suitability of a registered 
childminder.25 Negligent advice leading to psychological or mental damage may likewise be 
actionable. So persons offering psychological or educational advice to members of the public were 
bound to exercise the skill and care reasonably to be expected of a reasonable psychologist or 
teacher.26 
Reasonable reliance on negligent words 
In financial loss cases where the question is whether the rule in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & 
Partners Ltd27 applies, the question whether the claimant has reasonably relied on the defendant’s 
words has assumed a fundamental significance. The point is illustrated in the decision of the Supreme 
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Court in NRAM Ltd v Steel,28 but the analysis underlying the decision arguably creates unnecessary 
difficulty. A solicitor (S) sent an email to a client that misrepresented the nature of a transaction 
between the client and a finance company (NR), this in circumstances where the nature and terms of 
the transaction were fully known by NR. Lord Wilson accepted that a commercial lender about to 
implement an agreement with a borrower referable to its security did not act reasonably if it 
proceeded upon no more than a description of its terms put forward by or on behalf of the borrower. 
Here NR knew the terms of the agreement, and insofar as its officers who saw and acted on the email 
had never been aware of the terms or had forgotten them, immediate access to the correct terms lay 
- literally - at their finger-tips. No authority had been cited in which it had been held that there was an 
assumption of responsibility for a careless misrepresentation about a fact wholly within the 
knowledge of the representee. It was not reasonable for the representee to rely on the representation 
without checking its accuracy, and it was reasonable for the representor not to foresee that he would 
do so. The company’s claim accordingly was dismissed. 
Ordinary principle requires that a defendant should be able reasonably to foresee harm to the 
claimant, and it follows that it must be reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on what the defendant has 
said. So, as recognised by Lord Wilson, reasonable reliance causing foreseeable harm is a requirement 
in all cases. However, the suggested difficulty with his Lordship’s judgment arises from its conflation 
of the need for reasonable reliance with the suggested test for imposing a duty of care in the 
circumstances of the case founded upon whether the defendant had assumed responsibility for her 
words. His reasoning in reaching this point thus needs to be examined. 
Lord Wilson considered that the need for the representee reasonably to have relied on the 
representation and for the representor reasonably to have foreseen that he would do so lay at the 
heart of the decision in Hedley Byrne. In the light of the disclaimer, how could it have been reasonable 
for the appellant to rely on the representation? If it was not reasonable for a representee to have 
relied on a representation and for the representor to have foreseen that he would do so, it was difficult 
to imagine that the latter would have assumed responsibility for it. If it was not reasonable for a 
representee to have relied on a representation, it might often follow that it was not reasonable for 
the representor to have foreseen that he would do so. But the two inquiries remained distinct. 
His Lordship recognised that in the decades which followed the decision in the Hedley Byrne case, it 
became clear that not all claims in tort for losses consequent upon representations carelessly made 
could satisfactorily be despatched by reference to whether the representor had assumed 
responsibility for it towards the representee. Smith v Eric S Bush29 was an example, but Lord Griffiths, 
giving the leading judgment, explained the decision in ‘arrestingly wide’ terms. He said that the test 
of an assumption of responsibility was neither helpful nor realistic, and propounded instead a 
threefold test by reference to which the surveyors owed a duty of care to the claimants. The test 
required first that it was foreseeable that, were the information given negligently, the claimants would 
be likely to suffer damage; second that there was a sufficiently proximate relationship between the 
parties; and third that it was just and reasonable to impose the liability. 
Months later came the Caparo decision, and his Lordship noted that for years afterwards the speeches 
in the House were taken to have endorsed the threefold test. However, Lord Bridge observed that the 
concepts of proximity and fairness were so imprecise as to deprive them of utility as practical tests, 
and Lord Oliver suggested that the three suggested ingredients of the so-called test were usually facets 
of the same thing and that to search for a single formula was to pursue a will-o’-the-wisp. That the 
House in Caparo did not indorse the threefold test was explained by Lord Toulson in Michael v Chief 
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Constable of South Wales Police30 and underlined by Lord Reed in Robinson v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire Police.31 And more important for the purposes of the case at hand was the reassertion in 
Caparo of the need for a representee to establish that it was reasonable for him to have relied on the 
representation and that the representor should reasonably have foreseen that he would do so.32  
Next, in Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc33 the House held that, in writing a reference for the claimant 
who had worked for them and who was now seeking work elsewhere, the defendants owed him a 
duty of care. Lord Goff explained that the basis of his conclusion was that the defendants had assumed 
responsibility to the claimant in respect of the reference within the meaning of the Hedley Byrne case. 
Weeks later, in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd,34 the House held that underwriting agents at 
Lloyd’s owed a duty of care to a member in their conduct of his underwriting affairs even in the 
absence of any contract between them, and once again Lord Goff held that the case should be decided 
by reference to the concept of an assumption of responsibility. Again, in Williams v Natural Life Health 
Foods Ltd35 Lord Steyn remarked that there was no better rationalisation for liability in tort for 
negligent misrepresentation than the concept of an assumption of responsibility.  
Lord Wilson concluded that it had become clear that, although it might require cautious incremental 
development in order to fit cases to which it did not readily apply, this concept remained the 
foundation of the liability. So the legal consequences of the solicitor’s careless misrepresentation were 
clearly governed by whether, in making it, she assumed responsibility for it towards NR. The concept 
fitted the present case perfectly and there was no need to consider whether there should be any 
incremental development of it. However, the case had an unusual dimension, in that the claim was 
brought by one party to an arm’s length transaction against the solicitor who was acting for the other 
party. A solicitor owed a duty of care to the party for whom he is acting but generally owed no duty 
to the opposite party.36 The absence of that duty ran parallel with the absence of any general duty of 
care on the part of one litigant towards his opponent.37 And the relevant authorities38 demonstrated 
that the solicitor would not assume responsibility towards the opposite party unless it was reasonable 
for the latter to have relied on what the solicitor said and unless the solicitor should reasonably have 
foreseen that he would do so. 
Manifestly, then, Lord Wilson endorses an ‘assumption of responsibility’ as the governing test in 
Hedley Byrne and, indeed, some other cases involving negligently inflicted financial loss. However, his 
Lordship only reaches this conclusion by treating reasonable reliance and reasonable foreseeability of 
such reliance as the test for whether there is a duty of care and as constituting the requisite 
assumption of responsibility. But the question of reasonable reliance is not a duty concept save insofar 
as it bears upon the initial question of foreseeability of harm. Clearly there must always be reliance in 
fact, or a claim will fail for lack of proof that the words caused any harm.39 Assuming reliance can be 
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shown, a claim still cannot get off the ground without that reliance being reasonable and hence 
foreseeable. But this is not all, and the question remains whether a duty is owed to the particular 
person bringing the claim. As will be explained, this question is determined broadly by reference to 
pointers as to the closeness of the relationship between them and the purpose of the words 
concerned. Reliance may indeed be reasonable, yet no duty is owed. Take a Caparo-type case where 
a small investor sues a company auditor. Reliance on the audit may be entirely reasonable and 
sensible, and easily to be contemplated, yet for compelling reasons of policy no duty is owed. Again 
as will be explained, there may exceptionally be an actual acceptance by a defendant that he or she 
will take responsibility for his or her words, yet nearly always there is no such acceptance and the 
court decides whether to impose a duty in the circumstances of the case. The clear trend in many 
recent decisions, to be considered below, recognises this truth. Contrary to Lord Wilson’s opinion, and 
in agreement with Lord Griffiths, to say there has been an assumption of responsibility represents a 
conclusion, not an argument.  
It also seems timely to offer some continuing support to the maligned threefold approach to the duty 
issue that was taken in Caparo. It does not seem correct to say that Michael and Robinson rejected 
Caparo as a test. Rather, they clarified the importance of precedent and the cautious development of 
the law governing the duty question, and explained when the ‘fair, just and reasonable’ limb ought, 
somewhat exceptionally, to be invoked. That the three ingredients are imprecise and overlap does not 
mean that they are of no analytical value. To the contrary, they provide a helpful way of thinking about 
a duty problem.40 
One further point about reliance on a negligent statement needs to be made. In a number of cases 
the courts have maintained that when a person has taken another's statement at face value and has 
acted on the faith of it, as it was intended that he should, the representor cannot be heard to say that 
the representee was in part the author of his own misfortune because he could with reasonable 
diligence have discovered the true position.41 This might suggest that there can be no defence of 
contributory negligence, but seemingly there is no absolute rule and a finding of contributory 
negligence should, perhaps exceptionally, be possible even where reliance is reasonable. 
Assuming responsibility for negligent words 
A continuing source of uncertainty and debate is the relationship between the Caparo formula – 
which, when appropriately invoked or applied, appears to be of general application - and the 
proposition that a duty of care in the case of misstatements is founded upon the speaker’s assumption 
of responsibility for what he or she says. Indeed, this test, or something like it, is found in all of the 
speeches in Hedley Byrne. Yet frequently it is not made at all clear what amounts to an assumption of 
responsibility and how it can be established.  
The courts have recognised that it may sometimes be reasonable to infer an assumption of 
responsibility in the case of a voluntary provision of a service. In Customs and Excise Commissioners v 
Barclays Bank Plc42 Lord Mance said that where there was fiduciary relationship, and where the 
defendant had voluntarily answered a question or tendered skilled advice or services in circumstances 
where he knew or ought to have known that an identified plaintiff would rely on his answers or advice, 
the special relationship was created by the defendant voluntarily assuming to act in the matter by 
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involving himself in the plaintiff's affairs or by choosing to speak.43 Lejonvarn v Burgess44 is a recent 
instance. A friend and former neighbour of the claimants agreed, without any contract, to provide 
professional services as an architect on a landscaping project for the claimants’ garden, and she did in 
fact provide the services and was relied on by the claimants properly to perform them, and in the 
circumstances the Court of Appeal held that she had assumed a responsibility and that she owed a 
duty of care to the claimants. She did not have to provide any services, but to the extent that she did 
she owed a duty to exercise skill and care in their provision.45  
In cases of this kind and, indeed, in any Hedley Byrne case, the court usually makes a determination 
that the defendant assumed responsibility rather than finds that he or she did so in fact. Sometimes 
indeed such a determination is justified, in circumstances where a person has actually assumed 
responsibility for his or her words in more or less specific terms. Such an indication is likely to be rare, 
but if it has been given it will be reasonable to impose a duty. However, in most cases there is no 
actual assumption of responsibility, and the courts use the expression in cases where a person has 
chosen to speak in circumstances where the law imposes a duty to take care.46 Used in this sense, of 
course, it does not tell us what those circumstances are. 
In the Barclays Bank case there was general agreement that the notion of an assumption of 
responsibility was or could be of some help in a Hedley Byrne action, but that the concept could not 
be used as a general touchstone for liability in negligence for financial loss. Lord Bingham said it was 
clear that the test was to be applied objectively: it was not answered by consideration of what the 
defendant thought or intended. Yet he recognised that the further it was removed from the actions 
and intentions of the actual defendant, the more notional the assumption of responsibility became 
and the less difference there was from the approach taken in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman. In truth 
Barclays Bank tends to the view that the law deems a defendant to have assumed responsibility where 
there is a proximate or special relationship between the parties in circumstances where policy 
supports a duty. On this view the Hedley Byrne inquiry does not stand apart from other duty questions 
although, as Lord Mance noted, it may subsume the elements of the Caparo inquiry. This overlap was 
spelled out in Lejonvarn v Burgess,47 where the Court of Appeal recognised that in a case involving the 
voluntary provision of a service (as in that case), there was no need to make a further inquiry into 
whether it would be fair, just and reasonable to impose liability, because such considerations would 
have been taken into account in determining whether there had been an assumption of responsibility. 
On this, seemingly correct, view the two identified approaches simply constitute different ways of 
arriving at the same conclusion. Again, in CGL Group Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc48 Beatson LJ, 
making a similar point in another way, observed that it was necessary carefully to analyse the various 
factors relevant to ascertaining whether a duty of care existed under all the tests, rather than focusing 
exclusively on ‘assumption of responsibility’. And in P & P Property Ltd v Owen White & Catlin llp 49 the 
court recognised that an assumption of responsibility by a solicitor to a non-client would rarely be 
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voluntary, and the professional would be treated as having assumed responsibility if the imposition of 
liability would be fair and reasonable. 
Proximate relationship between adviser and advisee 
It is apparent from all this that an imposed ‘assumption of responsibility’ serves as a label rather than 
as a test. Rather, the crucial question is whether a sufficiently close or ‘special’ relationship between 
defendant and plaintiff can be established so as to justify the imposition of a duty. In most cases there 
is no voluntary assumption of responsibility, but the law may deem the defendant to have assumed 
responsibility and find proximity accordingly if, when making the statement in question, the defendant 
foresaw or ought to have foreseen that the plaintiff would reasonably place reliance on what was said 
in the light of the purpose for which the statement was made and the purpose for which the claimant 
relied on it. This indeed is consistent with the analysis put forward by Lord Oliver in his frequently 
cited words in Caparo itself. His Lordship said:50 
What can be deduced from the Hedley Byrne case, therefore, is that the necessary relationship 
between the maker of a statement or giver of advice (‘the adviser’) and the recipient who acts in 
reliance upon it (‘the advisee’) may typically be held to exist where (1) the advice is required for a 
purpose, whether particularly specified or generally described, which is made known, either 
actually or inferentially, to the adviser at the time when the advice is given; (2) the adviser knows, 
either actually or inferentially, that his advice will be communicated to the advisee, either 
specifically or as a member of an ascertainable class, in order that it should be used by the advisee 
for that purpose; (3) it is known, either actually or inferentially, that the advice so communicated 
is likely to be acted upon by the advisee for that purpose without independent inquiry; and (4) it is 
so acted upon by the advisee to his detriment. 
This kind of approach is well illustrated in two recent and leading decisions, one in Canada and one in 
the UK. In Deloitte & Touche v Livent Inc,51 the Canadian case, a company auditor (D) failed to uncover 
a fraud by the directors of a company (L) in manipulating the company’s records, but did identify 
irregularities in the reporting of profit from an asset sale. D did not resign but prepared documents in 
order for L to be able to solicit investment, and then proceeded to prepare L’s 1997 audit. New equity 
investors later discovered the fraud, and a re-audit resulted in restated financial reports. The Supreme 
Court of Canada held that in these circumstances the continuing services provided by D to L were 
undertaken for the purpose of helping L to solicit investment, and that L was entitled to rely upon D 
taking reasonable care. A relationship of proximity arose, but only in respect of the content of D’s 
undertaking. D did not alter the purpose for which it undertook to provide the 1997 audit or disclaim 
liability in relation to that purpose, so proximity was established in relation to the statutory audit on 
the basis of the already recognised proximate relationship. By negligently conducting the audit, and 
impairing L’s shareholders’ ability to verse management, D exposed L to reasonably foreseeable risks, 
including losses that would have been avoided with a proper audit. 
The UK decision is Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA.52 The claimant (PCL) 
wanted a credit reference for a customer (B) who had applied for a cheque cashing facility in order to 
gamble at its casino. However, in order to preserve customer confidentiality, PCL’s practice was not 
itself to ask its customer’s bank for the reference. Instead, it arranged for an associated company (BSS) 
to do so without disclosing the purpose of the inquiry or the fact that the reference was required for 
the benefit of another company. The request was then sent to PCL’s bankers, who forwarded it to the 
customer’s bank (BNL) under cover of a letter stated to be on behalf of BSS and seeking BNL’s opinion 
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on the character and standing of B. The reply, addressed to BSS, confirmed that B had an account with 
BNL and that he was trustworthy up to the specified amount. It added: ‘This information is given in 
strict confidential’ (sic). In reliance on the reference, PCL granted (and shortly afterwards increased) 
the cheque cashing facility. B thereafter played at the casino, drawing two cheques on BNL in return 
for gaming chips of the same amount, and made substantial winnings which PCL paid out to him. He 
then disappeared overseas and both cheques were returned unpaid. It was common ground that BNL 
had no reasonable basis for their reference. It held no account for B until two days after the reference 
was sent, when an account was opened in his name which always had a nil balance until it was 
eventually closed. 
Lord Sumption, drawing upon Lord Oliver’s judgment in Caparo, said that the defendant’s knowledge 
of the transaction in respect of which a statement was made was potentially relevant for three 
purposes: (i) to identify some specific person or group of persons to whom he could be said to assume 
responsibility; (ii) to demonstrate that the claimant’s reliance on the statement would be financially 
significant; and (iii) to limit the degree of responsibility which the defendant was taken to assume if 
no financial limit was expressly mentioned. Thus, in Hedley Byrne itself, the defendant understood 
that the statement would be relied on by the unidentified, but readily identifiable, client on whose 
behalf the bank was known to be making the inquiry. It was enough that the proposed transaction 
was said to be an advertising contract, and it would probably have been enough even if the transaction 
had only been identified as some kind of business transaction. In Caparo on the other hand, where 
the persons said to have been entitled to rely on the defendant’s audit report were any potential 
bidder for the auditor’s client, the absence of a specific transaction in the defendant’s contemplation 
assumed decisive significance. 
Counsel for the claimant accepted that in the ordinary course where a statement was relied upon by 
B to whom A had passed it on, the representor owed no duty to B unless he knew that the statement 
was likely to be communicated to B. Lord Sumption was satisfied that the concession was plainly 
justified, and thought further that, if the representor was to be taken to assume responsibility to B, it 
should also be part of the statement’s known purpose that it should be communicated and relied upon 
by B. Counsel submitted to the contrary that PCL was BSS’s undisclosed principal and that the 
relationship between BNL and PCL was ‘equivalent to contract’, because in contract PCL would have 
been entitled to declare itself and assume the benefit of the contract. However, his Lordship rejected 
the argument as fallacious. First, it did not follow from the fact that a non-contractual relationship 
between two parties was as proximate as a contractual relationship, that it was legally the same as a 
contractual relationship or involved all of the same legal incidents. Secondly, the relationship between 
a person dealing with another and the latter’s undisclosed principal was not at all analogous to the 
kind of relationship which would give rise to a duty of care. The whole point about the law relating to 
undisclosed principals was that a person might be brought into contractual relations with someone 
with whom he had no factual relationship at all. Such a relationship was by definition not proximate. 
Nor was it in any relevant sense voluntary or consensual so as to give rise to an assumption of 
responsibility. It had none of the features which were held in Caparo to be necessary to bring the 
claimant into proximity with the defendant. 
Lord Sumption concluded that, in the instant case, BNL had no reason to suppose that BSS was acting 
for someone else, and they knew nothing of PCL. In those circumstances, it was plain that they did not 
voluntarily assume any responsibility to PCL. It might well be, since they knew nothing of BSS either, 
that they were indifferent to whom they were dealing with. But the fact that a representor might have 
been equally willing to assume a duty to someone else did not mean that he could be treated as if he 
had done so.53 
Deloitte & Touche and Playboy Club London both illustrate the theme advanced in this article, that 
‘assuming a responsibility’ in the Hedley Byrne context usually involves finding a close and proximate 
relationship between the parties in the sense explained by Lord Oliver in Caparo. Indeed, Lord 
Sumption in Playboy specifically spells this out. This undoubtedly is a helpful explanation of the cases, 
for it points us to key factors which determine whether a duty of care is likely to be recognised on the 
facts of any particular case. By contrast, posing the question in terms of whether the defendant has 
assumed responsibility towards the claimant is more likely to conceal them. 
Financial loss in non-Hedley Byrne cases 
In contrast to Robinson and Darnley, the decision of the Supreme Court in James-Bowen v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis54 concerned a question which was not covered by existing 
authority. Four police officers serving in the Metropolitan Police Service took part in the arrest of a 
suspected terrorist, BA, who made allegations that the officers had seriously assaulted and injured 
him during the arrest. The complaints were investigated by the Metropolitan Police Service’s 
Directorate of Professional Standards and the Crown Prosecution Service, who concluded that there 
was no case to answer, and a charge brought against one respondent at the instigation of the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission was dismissed by the relevant disciplinary panel. BA 
subsequently issued civil proceedings alleging that the Commissioner was vicariously liable for the 
assaults he alleged had been committed by the officers. During the trial the Commissioner settled the 
claim on the basis of agreed damages and costs, together with an admission of liability and an apology 
for ‘gratuitous violence’ to which BA had been subjected by the officers. The officers were then 
charged with one count of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm arising out of the arrest of BA, 
and following a trial they were all acquitted. The officers thereupon sued the Commissioner for, inter 
alia, the damage done to their reputations and for economic loss stemming from the way the 
Commissioner had acted in the course of the litigation brought by BA and in settling the claim. Jay J 
struck out the claims and entered summary judgment for the Commissioner,55 but the Court of Appeal 
allowed the appeal, holding that it was arguable that the Commissioner owed the alleged duty of 
care.56 However, on further appeal, the Supreme Court held unanimously that no such duty was owed 
and that the claim should be dismissed. 
Lord Lloyd-Jones said that the case was very clearly one in which it was sought to extend a duty of 
care to a new situation, and in determining whether such a duty should be recognised the law would 
proceed incrementally and by analogy with previous decisions. In addition, the proposed duty would 
be tested against considerations of legal policy, and judgment would have to be exercised with 
particular regard to both the achievement of justice in the particular case and the coherent 
development of the law. The instant claims were concerned with reputation, which the law protected 
via actions such as libel, slander, malicious falsehood and passing off. Moreover, a variety of other 
causes of action including breach of confidence, misuse of private information and causes of action in 
relation to data protection and intellectual property might often indirectly achieve this result. The 
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common law did not usually recognise a duty of care in the tort of negligence to protect reputational 
interests, although there were exceptions. In Spring Guardian Assurance plc57 the House of Lords 
recognised a duty owed by an employer to a former employee in writing him a reference, with three 
of their Lordships basing this on the three ingredients identified by Lord Bridge in Caparo. However, it 
might be that an assumption of responsibility by the author of the reference to the plaintiff, as 
favoured by Lord Goff, was the better rationalisation in these circumstances. Lord Lloyd-Jones thought 
that the decision should be contrasted with Calveley v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police,58 
holding that a Chief Constable did not, in principle, owe a duty of care to protect the economic and 
reputational interests of his officers in respect of the prosecution of an investigation or disciplinary 
proceedings. Calveley had an important bearing on the instant case. If there was no duty in those 
circumstances, it was difficult to see why the Chief Constable should owe a duty to his officers as to 
the manner in which he defended a claim brought against him by a third party.  
In light of these authorities, Lord Lloyd-Jones turned to test the proposed duty of care against relevant 
policy considerations and to consider the coherence of the resulting state of the law if such a duty was 
recognised. Critically, the interests of an employer who was sued on the basis that he was vicariously 
liable for the tortious conduct of his employees differed fundamentally from the interests of those 
employees. The employer had to be able to make his own investigation into the claim and to assess 
its strength. He needed to form his own view as to the reliability and veracity of his employee and how 
he was likely to perform as a witness, and to decide what degree of importance he attached to 
successfully defending the claim and what financial and other resources should be devoted to its 
defence. He might consider that, however strong the prospects of a successful defence, he could not 
justify the cost and effort of defending the claim and that it should, therefore, be settled. The 
predominant interest of the employee, by contrast, would be that his reputation should be vindicated. 
The position would often be complicated further by the existence of inconsistent views or interests 
between different employees or groups of employees. These stark differences strongly suggested that 
it would not be fair, just or reasonable to impose on an employer a duty of care to defend legal 
proceedings so as to protect the economic or reputational interests of his employee. A further 
dimension was that the Commissioner held a public office and had responsibility for the Metropolitan 
Police Service, and in the conduct of the proceedings against her she had to be free to act as she 
considered appropriate in accordance with her public duty. 
Various policy considerations relating to the conduct of litigation also weighed heavily against any 
duty of care. First, an employer who wished to defend a claim based on vicarious liability for the 
alleged conduct of his employees should be entitled to defend the claim in the way he saw fit, without 
having constantly to look over his shoulder for fear that his conduct of the defence might expose him 
to a claim by his employees that the case should have been run differently. The proposed duty would 
inevitably have a chilling effect on the conduct of the defence. An employer would, understandably, 
be less likely to make admissions in circumstances where they were objectively justified or to make 
use of evidence which reflected unfavourably on an employee, for fear of the subsequent 
repercussions. Second, a duty to defend a claim effectively would be inconsistent with the important 
legal policy which encouraged the settlement of civil claims. The risk of exposure to consequential 
claims would operate as a powerful disincentive to settlement. Third, a duty could result in delay or 
disruption of civil proceedings. Disputes between employers and employees as to the appropriate way 
in which the defence should be conducted could well paralyse the defence. And fourth, recognition of 
a duty would be a fruitful source of satellite litigation. It would be likely to result in a proliferation of 
consequential claims which would often amount to a collateral challenge to the outcome of earlier 
proceedings. 
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Finally, Lord Lloyd-Jones thought there was force in the Commissioner’s submission concerning the 
implications of the proposed duty for legal professional privilege. The effective defence of proceedings 
by employees against the employer brought on the basis that the earlier proceedings were conducted 
in breach of duty might well require waiver of privilege in order to demonstrate the contrary. This had 
the potential to undermine the effective conduct of the defence of the original claim against the 
employer in that the possibility of such a claim in negligence and the likelihood of having to waive 
privilege might well inhibit frank discussion between the employer and his legal advisers. This was, 
therefore, a further consideration which weighed against the recognition of the duty of care for which 
the officers contended. 
The decision perhaps is hard on the disappointed claimants, but that may often be the result in cases 
where a duty is denied for reasons of policy unconnected with whatever merits a claim may otherwise 
have. Certainly Lord Lloyd-Jones was able to point to various compelling policy concerns. In particular, 
a duty which may give rise to conflicting interests is likely to be denied, at least as in the instant case 
where the conflict might require the defendant to take into account the interests of the opposing 
party in his or her conduct of the claim. Solicitors similarly do not normally owe a duty of care to the 
other party to litigation involving their client, for the solicitor must act with undivided loyalty in the 
client’s best interests.59 Again, in D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust60 a majority of the 
House of Lords held that health care and childcare professionals investigating allegations of child 
abuse did not owe a duty of care to the parents of the children concerned. Lord Nicholls maintained 
that health professionals should not be subject to potentially conflicting duties when deciding whether 
a child may have been abused, or when deciding whether their doubts should be communicated to 
others, or when deciding what further investigatory or protective steps should be taken. In principle 
the appropriate level of protection for a parent suspected of abuse was that clinical or other 
investigations should be conducted in good faith. This afforded suspected parents a similar level of 
protection to that afforded generally to persons suspected of committing crimes. 
Even so, as recognised in James-Bowen, the fact that the recognition of a duty of care may potentially 
subject an individual to conflicting duties is not, of itself, necessarily conclusive against its recognition 
in all situations, and it is necessary to have regard to the competing underlying policy considerations. 
As for these, the numerous ways in which the proposed duty in James-Bowen might have a negative 
impact on the conduct of adversarial litigation all pointed to the need to reject it. 
Omissions by property owners 
Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd61 is a leading case governing the liability of an owner of property 
for damage to a neighbour caused by the state of the property or something done on it. Lord Goff 
recognised two bases upon which a duty may be imposed. One was where a defendant had knowledge 
or means of knowledge that a third party had created or was creating a risk of danger on the premises 
and failed to prevent the danger from damaging neighbouring property. The other was where the 
defendant’s negligence caused or permitted to be caused a source of danger and it was reasonably 
foreseeable that third parties might interfere with it and, sparking off the danger, cause damage to 
the plaintiff. These principles have been applied in a number of cases concerning failures to prevent 
danger caused by intruders on land from escaping and causing damage. In Smith itself the danger was 
a fire in a derelict cinema started by vandals, and a neighbour’s claim for damage caused by the fire 
spreading was held to fail. The defendants had not known of any previous acts of vandalism involving 
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fire or a risk of fire, and nor could the empty cinema be described as an unusual danger in the nature 
of a fire hazard. 
The question also has arisen whether the owner of a motor vehicle can be held responsible on similar 
principles for damage done by a person who interferes with or steals the vehicle. The decisions show 
that, normally, a motor vehicle cannot be regarded as posing a special danger such that the owner is 
obliged to take care to prevent someone else from using it. In Topp v London Country Bus (South West) 
Ltd62 the defendant parked his minibus outside a pub and left it unlocked and with the key in the 
ignition. An unknown person stole it and later that day knocked down and killed the plaintiff’s wife. 
The Court of Appeal held that even if the defendant was at fault he was not liable for the intervening 
act of another person who was a complete stranger to him.  
In Rankin (Rankin’s Garage & Sales) v JJ63 a similar question came before the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Two minors (J and C) were at the house of C’s mother drinking alcohol and taking drugs. Sometime 
after midnight they decided to walk around town, with the intention of stealing valuables from 
unlocked cars. Eventually they found an unlocked car with the keys in the ashtray parked on the 
property of a commercial garage (R). C did not have a driver’s licence and had never driven on the 
road, but he decided to steal the car and told J to get in, which he did. C then drove the car out of the 
garage and on the highway where, shortly, afterwards, the car crashed, causing J to suffer catastrophic 
injury. Through his litigation guardian, J sued R, C and C’s mother for negligence. At the trial it was 
held, inter alia, that R owed a duty of care to J, and this finding was upheld in the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. On a further appeal to the Supreme Court it was held in a majority judgment (McLachlin CJ 
and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Côté and Rowe JJ, Gascon and Brown JJ dissenting) that 
the appeal should be allowed and the claim against R dismissed. 
Karakatsanis J said that the question was whether the type of harm suffered was reasonably 
foreseeable to someone in the position of R when considering the security of the vehicles stored at 
the garage. The evidence could establish, as the jury found, that R ought to have known of the risk of 
theft. However, physical injury was only foreseeable when there was something in the facts to suggest 
that there was not only a risk of theft, but a risk that the stolen vehicle might be operated in a 
dangerous manner. To find a duty of care, there needed to be some circumstance or evidence to 
suggest that a person in the position of R ought to have reasonably foreseen the risk of injury — that 
the stolen vehicle could be operated unsafely. In the circumstances of this case, the courts below 
relied upon the risk of theft by minors (who could well be inexperienced or reckless drivers) to connect 
the failure to secure the vehicles with the nature of the harm suffered, personal injury. The risk of 
theft in general did not automatically include the risk of theft by minors.  Some evidentiary basis was 
required before a court could conclude that the risk of theft included the risk of theft by minors. Here, 
there was insufficient evidence to suggest that minors would frequent the premises at night, or be 
involved in joyriding or theft. Aside from evidence that could establish a risk of theft in general, there 
was nothing else to connect the risk of theft of the car to the risk of someone being physically injured. 
The evidence did not provide specific circumstances to make it reasonably foreseeable that the stolen 
car might be driven in a way that would cause personal injury. 
His Honour concluded that J had not met the burden of establishing a prima facie duty of care owed 
by R. Reasonable foreseeability of personal injury could not be established. A business would only owe 
a duty to someone who was injured following the theft of a vehicle when, in addition to theft, the 
unsafe operation of the stolen vehicle was reasonably foreseeable. 
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Gascon and Brown JJ maintained, by contrast, that the case involved the application of a category of 
relationships that had long been recognised as imposing a duty of care — namely, where the 
defendant’s act foreseeably caused physical harm to the plaintiff. Imposition of a duty of care was 
conditioned in the instant case only upon J showing that physical injury to him was reasonably 
foreseeable under any circumstances flowing from R’s negligence. It was open to the trial judge to 
conclude that R’s negligence in leaving unattended vehicles unlocked with keys inside overnight could 
have led to reasonably foreseeable physical injury. There was no palpable and overriding error in those 
findings and, therefore, they should not be interfered with. 
The majority view in Rankin is broadly consistent with UK law. Perhaps a car in itself should be seen 
as a source of special danger, but that seems unrealistic in light of the prevalence of car ownership in 
the UK and elsewhere. Obviously it is entirely normal. Rather, there needs to be something more 
which indicates why in the circumstances a car poses a particular danger of some kind, or there is 
some reason why the owner comes under a duty to control the driver. Otherwise the normal rule that 
A is not liable for failing to prevent B from causing harm to C will apply.64 The view taken by the 
minority, simply that physical injury to J was reasonably foreseeable on R leaving the car with the keys 
in it, is not enough. On the particular facts the only possible basis for a duty would seem to lie in the 
application of a principle analogous to that in Smith, which, as suggested, has to fail. 
The position would be different if the claim was for the loss of the car. So a custodian of someone 
else’s car who left the keys in the ignition could be liable to the owner for its theft, but in the instant 
case it was the negligent driving of the thief, not the taking of the car, that caused the damage.65 
Vicarious liability 
Independent contractors 
The orthodox understanding of the doctrine of vicarious liability for long was that it depended for its 
application on the distinction between a contract creating an employer-employee relationship 
(sometimes termed a contract of service), and a contract which created the most significant 
alternative relationship arising from work for reward, that between a principal and an independent 
contractor (sometimes termed a contract for services). However, starting with the decision in Canada 
in John Doe v Bennett66 and in England with the Christian Brothers case,67 the doctrine has been 
significantly extended, by including within its ambit certain relationships that are analogous to 
employment. In the latter case Lord Phillips said that the objective was to ensure, insofar as it was fair, 
just and reasonable, that liability for tortious wrong was borne by a defendant with the means to 
compensate the victim. Such defendants could usually be expected to insure against the risk of such 
liability, so that this risk was more widely spread. It was for the court to identify the policy reasons 
why it was fair, just and reasonable to impose vicarious liability and to lay down the criteria that had 
to be shown to be satisfied. They were: (i) the employer was more likely to have the means to 
compensate the victim than the employee and could be expected to have insured against that liability; 
(ii) the tort would have been committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee on behalf 
of the employer; (iii) the employee's activity was likely to be part of the business activity of the 
employer; (iv) the employer, by employing the employee to carry on the activity would have created 
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the risk of the tort committed by the employee; (v) The employee would, to a greater or lesser degree, 
have been under the control of the employer. 
The core of the doctrine of vicarious liability traditionally had involved commercial employers being 
held liable for negligence by their employees that was committed in the course of employment. These 
new developments have been driven by cases involving child abuse committed by priests or other 
persons in circumstances where the defendant being sued was not their employer. However, in none 
of the cases mentioned above was the court required directly to address the question whether, by 
imposing liability on this wider basis, there might now also be vicarious liability for the tort of an 
independent contractor. But in Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants68 that question squarely arose. 
In this case 126 claimants sought damages against Barclays Bank (‘the Bank’) in respect of alleged 
sexual assaults to which they were subjected by a doctor (B) to whom the Bank referred them for 
medical assessments prior to their employment. The Bank argued that B (who had died 8 years earlier) 
was an independent contractor, but the trial judge was satisfied that the Christian Brothers factors 
pointed towards the imposition of liability69 and the Court of Appeal dismissed the Bank’s appeal. 
Irwin LJ observed that the law had been ‘on the move’ in recent time, and noted particularly that in 
Cox Lord Reed, drawing on Christian Brothers, focused on the relationship necessary between the 
tortfeasor and the defendant to found liability,70 and that in Mohamud Lord Toulson explored how 
the conduct of the tortfeasor had to be related to that relationship.71 Critically, Irwin LJ accepted that 
the law now required answers to the questions laid down in Cox and Mohamud and affirmed in 
Armes72 rather than an answer to the question: was the alleged tortfeasor an independent contractor? 
Applying the new approach to the facts, his Lordship said first that the judge was obviously right to 
conclude that the Bank had more means to satisfy the claims than had the (long distributed) estate of 
B. She was also correct to give this matter little weight. No liability could be founded on this 
consideration alone. On the second criterion - was the activity being taken on behalf of the Bank? - 
the answer was clearly ‘yes’, as the judge had concluded. While for most applicants it was right to say 
that the medical examination brought benefit to them, since it opened the door to employment, the 
principal benefit was to the prospective employer, for whom this step tended to ensure fit entrants 
able to give long service to the Bank. Thirdly, for the same reasons, the selection of suitable employees 
was also a part of the business activity of the Bank. As regards criterion four, the risk factor, the Bank 
specified the nature of the examinations as well as the time, place and examiner. The circumstances 
might less obviously give rise to the risk of tort than the long-term placement of children in a boarding 
school, in the care of supposedly celibate Brothers or priests, but the risk was, on these facts, perfectly 
properly established. Finally, the issue of the control exercised by the Bank over B was perhaps the 
most critical factor. The judge had concluded that the Bank was directional in identifying the questions 
to be asked and the examinations to be carried out, and exercised a higher level of control than might 
usually be found in the context of an examination required to be performed by a doctor, and she was 
correct in her findings and for the reasons she gave. She also was obviously correct that the medical 
examinations were sufficiently closely connected with the relationship between B and the Bank as to 
satisfy the second stage of the test for liability.  
Irwin LJ concluded by observing that it was understandable that a ‘bright line’ test, such as was said 
to be the status of independent contractor, would make easier the conduct of business for parties and 
their insurers. However, ease of business could not displace or circumvent the recent principles 
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established by the Supreme Court. Further, establishing whether an individual was an employee or a 
self-employed independent contractor could be full of complexity and of evidential pitfalls. The 
Cox/Mohamud questions would often represent no more challenging a basis for analysing the facts in 
a given case. 
Perhaps there is rather more doubt about whether the approach taken in recent Supreme Court 
decisions was intended to affect the employee/independent contractor distinction than Irwin LJ 
acknowledged. Those cases did not concern either employees or independent contractors, and 
arguably might be seen as not necessarily applicable in a case where the defendant has contracted 
with a person carrying on a recognisably independent business. In a recent decision in Singapore the 
Court of Appeal cautioned that the Christian Brothers criteria were not intended to effect a radical 
change in the law, but merely recognised that vicarious liability might be imposed outside the class of 
traditional employment relations.73 
At all events Kafagi v JBW Group Ltd74 is a decision going the other way. The respondent was a judicial 
services company which subcontracted the collection of certain council tax debts owed to the London 
Borough of Wandsworth to B, a certified bailiff. It was alleged that B and F, a companion, assaulted 
the appellant while seeking to collect such a debt and that the respondent was vicariously liable for 
their assault, but the Court of Appeal held that the claim should fail. Singh LJ noted that B ran his own 
business, that he could turn down work offered by the respondent, that he worked for other clients, 
and that he was at liberty to conduct the collection of a debt in whatever legal manner he saw fit, 
without control from the respondent. In particular he could share the work with another person, 
which was what he had done here. B also was obliged by the regulatory framework to provide a 
personal bond into court, which had nothing to do with the respondent, and he maintained his own 
indemnity insurance for his business. Finally there was not even the ‘vestigial degree of control’ to 
which Lord Reed made reference in Cox.75 In all the circumstances it was not a case where the 
relationship between the respondent and the two bailiffs could be regarded as ‘akin’ to a relationship 
of employment. In so deciding Singh LJ affirmed that the conventional distinction between a contract 
of employment and a contract of services continued to be relevant in the vast majority of situations. 
Close connection test 
The second limb formerly used as the general test for determining whether an employer was 
vicariously liable for a wrongdoing employee - whether the employee had acted within the scope of, 
or during the course of, his or her employment or authority – came to be seen as inadequate in cases 
where the employee acted in accordance with his or her own interests or desires and in a way which 
was deliberately wrongful and sometimes criminal. Certainly the difficulty in satisfying the test was 
manifest in sexual abuse cases. Applying the so-called Salmond test,76 in what sense could the sexual 
abuse of a pupil by a teacher be said to be an improper mode of performing authorised work? 
Accordingly it has been replaced, at least for some cases, by a different test, namely, whether the 
conduct was ‘closely connected’ with the employment (or relationship analogous to employment). In 
Bazley v Curry,77 in a highly influential judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada, McLachlin CJ 
identified the fundamental question as being whether the wrongful act was sufficiently related to 
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conduct authorised by the employer to justify the imposition of vicarious liability. So vicarious liability 
was generally appropriate where there was a significant connection between the creation or 
enhancement of a risk and the wrong that accrued therefrom, even if unrelated to the employer’s 
desires. In the UK, in the Christian Brothers case, Lord Phillips endorsed the Canadian approach. His 
Lordship said that vicarious liability was imposed where a defendant, whose relationship with the 
abuser put it in a position to use the abuser to carry on its business or to further its own interests, had 
done so in a manner which had created or significantly enhanced the risk that the victim or victims 
would suffer the relevant abuse. The essential closeness of connection between the relationship 
between the defendant and the tortfeasor and the acts of abuse thus involved a strong causative link. 
The above cases were both claims involving child abuse. But a test asking whether there is a close 
connection between a person’s wrongdoing and his or her relationship with another where that 
relationship creates a special risk of harm to the victim has been applied in other cases of deliberate 
wrongdoing. In Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc78 the Supreme Court recognised that the 
close connection test could apply broadly in cases where the question of the link between the 
relationship and the wrongdoing was in issue. Lord Toulson said that the court had to consider two 
matters. The first question, to be addressed broadly, was what functions or ‘field of activities’ had 
been entrusted by the employer to the employee, or, in everyday language, what was the nature of 
his job. Secondly, the court had to decide whether there was sufficient connection between the 
position in which he was employed and his wrongful conduct to make it right for the employer to be 
held liable as a matter of social justice. The cases in which the necessary connection had been found 
were cases in which the employee used or misused the position entrusted to him in a way which 
injured the third party. 
Two recent decisions of the Court of Appeal have both imposed liability in circumstances falling close 
to the line. In Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd,79 the managing director (M) of the defendant 
employer violently assaulted the plaintiff employee (B) at a voluntary gathering for late night drinking 
in a hotel immediately following the workplace Christmas party. The assault came after B had 
challenged M about another employee’s appointment at one of the work branches. Asplin LJ, giving 
the leading judgment, allowed the plaintiff’s appeal and held that there was a sufficiently close 
connection between the assault and M’s employment as managing director. Applying Mohamud, her 
Ladyship was satisfied that M had responsibility for all management decisions, that his remit and his 
authority were very wide and that at the time of the assault he was purporting to exercise authority 
over his subordinate employees. While the unscheduled drinking session was not a seamless extension 
of the Christmas party, M organised and paid for taxis to and drinks at the hotel and work discussions 
continued there. Even if he had taken off his managerial hat when he arrived at the hotel, he chose to 
don it once more and misuse his position when his managerial decisions were challenged by B. There 
was no suggestion that M’s behaviour had arisen as a result of something personal. Irwin LJ agreed, 
saying that what was crucial was that the discussions about work became an exercise in M vehemently 
and crudely laying down the law with the intention of quelling dissent. That exercise of authority was 
something he was entitled to carry out, and it did arise from the field of activity assigned to him. But 
the facts were unusual, and the case emphatically was not authority for the proposition that 
employers became insurers for violent or other tortious acts by their employees. 
Suppose now that an employee deliberately harms a third party in order to strike at his or her 
employer. In WM Morrisons Supermarket PLC v Various Claimants80 the defendant employer was held 
vicariously liable for the criminal actions of a rogue employee, a senior IT auditor, in disclosing 
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personal information about the claimant co-employees on the web when motivated by a work-related 
grudge. The Court of Appeal considered that there was nothing unusual or novel in legal terms about 
the case, and rejected the argument that imposing vicarious liability might seem to render the court 
an accessory in fostering the employee’s criminal aims.  It was held in Mohamud that the motive of 
the wrongdoer (personal racism in that case) was irrelevant, and the court did not accept that there 
was an exception where the motive was, by causing harm to a third party, to cause financial or 
reputational damage to the employer. Nor was the court persuaded that a finding of vicarious liability 
would place an enormous burden on the defendants and other innocent employers in future cases. 
Major data breaches might, depending on the facts, lead to a large number of claims for potentially 
ruinous amounts, but the solution was to insure against such catastrophes; and employers could 
likewise insure against losses caused by dishonest or malicious employees. The fact of a defendant 
being insured was not a reason for imposing liability, but the availability of insurance was a valid 
answer to the Doomsday or Armageddon arguments put forward by counsel on behalf of Morrisons. 
The plea of ex turpi causa 
Inconsistency with the criminal law 
The circumstances in which a defendant may be able to rely on the defence that the claimant was 
engaged in illegal conduct at the time he or she suffered injury or damage is a controversial topic. 
Once again an influential judgment comes from the Supreme Court of Canada. In Hall v Hebert81 
McLachlin J maintained that the plea of ex turpi causa would bar recovery only where to allow it would 
undermine the integrity of the legal system, by introducing inconsistency into the law’s fabric. Thus a 
plaintiff would not be permitted to profit from his or her illegal conduct, as where a plaintiff claimed 
for financial loss arising from a joint illegal venture, or for exemplary damages; nor to evade a penalty 
prescribed by the criminal law, as where a burglar was caught due to his partner’s negligence and 
required to pay a fine. Accordingly, a wrongdoer could still recover damages insofar as this was not 
compensation for an illegal act but was compensation for the loss caused by the negligence of another.  
The distinction is clearly illustrated in the recent and already discussed decision of the Court in the 
Rankin case.82 As we have seen, the plaintiff was very seriously injured in an accident when he was a 
passenger in a car, being dangerously driven by a friend, which they had stolen from the defendant. 
Karakatsanis J observed in the course of his judgment that if the mere fact of illegal behaviour could 
eliminate a duty of care, this would effectively immunise negligent defendants from the consequences 
of their actions. The concern in Hall did not arise, and plaintiff wrongdoing was integrated into the 
analysis through contributory negligence.   
Gray v Thames Trains Ltd83 is a decision of the House of Lords where the defence applied. The plaintiff 
suffered major psychological harm and post-traumatic stress disorder after being involved in a train 
accident caused by the defendant’s negligence. He later stabbed a stranger to death, and was ordered 
to be detained in a mental hospital after pleading guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished 
responsibility. The defendants argued that they were not liable for loss of earnings after the date of 
the killing, on the basis that the claim was barred by the ex turpi causa rule. The argument was rejected 
in the Court of Appeal,84 but the decision was reversed on appeal to the House of Lords. Lord Hoffmann 
referred to a special rule of public policy saying, in its wider form, that you cannot recover for loss 
which you have suffered in consequence of your own criminal act, and in its narrower form, that you 
cannot recover for damage which flows from loss of liberty, fine or other punishment lawfully imposed 
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on you in consequence of your own unlawful act. Here, applying the narrower rule, it was the law 
which as a matter of penal policy caused the damage, and it would be inconsistent for the law to 
require a person to be compensated for that damage. 
The objection to the view of the Court of Appeal is that tort comes to play the criminal law’s 
conscience.85 The criminal conviction is premised on the offender’s free will, and awarding damages 
in respect of its consequences jeopardises the relationship between the criminal and the civil law by 
subverting the objects of the criminal law.86 But if a claimant is found not guilty by reason of insanity 
the position is different. So there was no bar to a claim against a mental health authority by a mental 
patient who had killed his father after his release but who was not guilty of murder by reason of 
insanity.87 
Assuming the claimant is guilty, is the degree of the claimant’s personal responsibility relevant? The 
House of Lords in Gray did not speak with one voice on the question. Lord Hoffmann clearly thought 
not, saying that it had to be assumed that the sentence was what the criminal court regarded as 
appropriate to reflect the personal responsibility of the accused for the crime he had committed. Lord 
Scott and Lord Rodger seemed to be of similar view. But Lord Phillips left open the situation where 
the criminal act of the defendant demonstrated the need to detain him both for his own treatment 
and for the protection of the public, but the trial judge made it clear that he did not consider that the 
defendant should bear significant personal responsibility for his crime. 
Impact of Patel v Mirza 
This difference in view was considered in Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Trust.88 The 
claimant, who had a history of paranoid schizophrenia, was discharged from her detention in hospital 
and subsequently stabbed her mother to death. She later pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the 
ground of diminished responsibility and was ordered to be detained in a secure hospital. In dismissing 
her claim for damages against the hospital, Jay J at first instance89 recognised that her personal 
responsibility for the offence was low and less than significant but that gradations of personal 
responsibility were irrelevant. The law followed a unitary or monist approach to the substantial 
impairment issue, and the damages claim was precluded on the ground of the illegality inherent in the 
claimant’s conviction. The Court of Appeal affirmed Jay J’s decision, and in so holding made it clear 
that the law would continue to take this approach notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Patel v Mirza.90 Counsel for the claimant argued that the mechanistic application of the Gray rule-
based approach led to injustice in cases such as the instant appeal, and that it would be 
disproportionate to deny a claimant compensation in a situation where her responsibility was less 
than significant whereas the tortfeasor's was so much greater. The Court of Appeal recognised that 
Patel was a decision based on an illegal contract and a claim alleging unjust enrichment, but also that 
the decision was expressed generally in relation to the common law of illegality and that it was 
impossible to discern in the majority judgments any suggestion that Gray or Clunis were wrongly 
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decided or to discern that they could not stand with the reasoning in Patel. So they remained binding 
and had to be applied. 
Let us consider what Patel decides. Lord Toulson’s ‘range of factors’ approach brings into account (a) 
the underlying purpose of the prohibition which had been transgressed, (b) any other relevant public 
policies which might be rendered ineffective or less effective by denial of the claim, and (c) the 
possibility of overkill unless the law was applied with a due sense of proportionality. Potentially 
relevant factors in determining the question of proportionality included the seriousness of the 
conduct, its centrality to the contract, whether it was intentional and whether there was marked 
disparity in the parties’ respective culpability. His Lordship thought that it was right for a court which 
was considering the application of the common law doctrine of illegality to have regard to the policy 
factors involved and to the nature and circumstances of the illegal conduct in determining whether 
the public interest in preserving the integrity of the justice system should result in denial of the relief 
claimed.91  
 
Lord Toulson’s majority view appears to abolish ex turpi causa as a rule of law, and sees considerations 
relating to the claimant’s illegal behaviour simply as a factor in the exercise of the court’s discretion 
in determining whether to allow the claim. Yet in accepting the continuing authority of Clunis and Gray 
the majority decision seems to treat the inconsistency argument as a continuing and absolute rule, 
and leaves the potential impact of Patel in tort cases generally somewhat up in the air. This points to 
a significant uncertainty as to whether or the extent to which previously existing authority on the 
ambit of the ex turpi causa rule continues to bind a court when the plea is put in issue. 
A rule that the courts will not assist claimants asserting certain base causes surely deserves to be 
supported, notwithstanding difficulty in defining the circumstances of its application. Suppose, 
further, that the inconsistency argument does not apply. Take the example of the hitman who fails to 
murder the proposed victim, whereupon the hirer demands his money back. Such a claim could be 
based upon restitutionary principles, as in Patel, and indeed Lord Neuberger, somewhat remarkably, 
thought that if a claimant paid a sum to the defendant to commit a crime, such as a murder or a 
robbery, the claimant should normally be able to recover the sum, irrespective of whether the 
defendant had committed, or even attempted to commit, the crime.92 This view is very hard to accept: 
how could a court conceivably lend its aid to enforce such a claim? The turpitude of the plaintiff’s 
conduct must necessarily bar any relief. The objection that the law comes to be founded on ad hoc 
value judgments is not insoluble. It should be possible for the courts to develop a reasonably 
consistent approach to the question. Indeed, a key part of the Patel inquiry focuses on the seriousness 
of the plaintiff’s criminality or wrongdoing. Furthermore, the exceptions identified by Lord Sumption, 
where the plaintiff’s illegal conduct is treated as involuntary or the plaintiff is the victim of 
exploitation, explain many of the cases.  
The better view is that the ex turpi causa principle should be retained as representing an expression 
of policy, and that that policy is not based upon a single justification but on a group of reasons which 
vary in different situations.93 That at least would avoid the difficulties in it being downgraded to a 
relevant factor in the exercise of a judicial discretion, albeit that the courts are likely to be able to 
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reach the same result on either view. Two key questions will continue to underlie a court’s 
determination of the issue. First, is the civil claim inconsistent with the criminal law in such a way that 
allowing the claim would undermine the integrity of the legal system, as explained by McLachlin J in 
Hall v Hebert? Second, even if not inconsistent, is the turpitude involved in the plaintiff’s conduct such 
that the grant of relief by a court would be contrary to the public interest in the sense explained by 
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